International Human Rights Fact-finding Praxis in its Living Forms: A TWAIL Perspective by Okafor, Obiora C.
The Transnational Human
Rights Review
Volume 1 (May 2014)
International Human Rights Fact-finding Praxis in
its Living Forms: A TWAIL Perspective
Obiora C. Okafor
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ookafor@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Transnational Human Rights Review by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Okafor, Obiora C.. "International Human Rights Fact-finding Praxis in its Living Forms: A TWAIL Perspective." The Transnational
Human Rights Review 1. (2014): 59-105.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol1/iss1/2
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
FACT-FINDING PRAXIS IN ITS LIVING 
FORMS: A TW AIL PERSPECTIVE 
By 
Obiora C. Okafor* 
1troduction 
...Afternational human rights fact-finding (hereinafter 
"IHRFF") has been defined, rather generously, as: 
A method of ascertaining facts through the 
evaluation and compilation of various 
information sources ... [which] serves to 
illuminate the circumstances, causes, 
consequences and aftermath of an event from a 
systematic collection of facts. 1 
* Professor of International Law at the Osgoode Hall Law School, York 
University, Toronto, Canada; Vice-Chair/Rapporteur at the UN Human 
Rights Council Advisory Committee; and most recently the Gani Fawehinmi 
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Human Rights Law at the Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Abuja, Nigeria. Ph. D, LL.M (the 
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada); LL.M, LL.B (Hons) 
(the University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus). I am grateful to Professors 
Phillip Alston and Sarah Knuckey, and the other organizers of the 
Conference on "International Human Rights Fact-Finding in the Twenty-
First Century" held at the New York University School of Law's Centre for 
Human Rights and Global Justice, 31 October to 2 November, 2013, for 
their invitation to prepare and present this article. I also wish to 
acknowledge my indebtedness to Joanna Enns for her excellent research 
assistance. 
l. T. Boutrouche, "Credible Fact-Finding and Allegations of International 
Humanitarian Law Violations: Challenges in Theory and Practice" (2011) 
16 J Conflict & Security Law l at 2 [Boutrouche]. See also International Bar 
Association and the Raoul Wallenberg Institute at Lund University, 
Guidelines 011 Intemarional Human Rights Fact-Finding Visits and Reports 
(the Lund-London Guidelines), lsl June 2009 at 2 [IBA]. 
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Understood in this way, IHRFF is not a new activity. 
Rather, various organizations, groups, and entities have 
engaged in it for a very long time. 2 Indeed, issues relating to 
its ways and means, conceptual and operational problems, and 
best practices have occupied the attention of many 
practitioners, and cringed the brows of many of scholars, for a 
fairly long time. 3 However, recent years have witnessed an 
increased deployment of IHRFF in response to alleged 
violations of human rights in a range of climes.4 This may be a 
possible justification for the renewed attention that it appears 
to receiving among academics and practitioners alike. In 
particular, given the increasing salience of IHRFF and the 
tremendous power that its practitioners can increasingly exert 
in both domestic and world affairs, contemporary scholarly 
commentators appear to be justified in renewing their quest to 
2. See D.F. Orentlicher: "Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human 
Rights Fact-Finding" (1990) 3 Harv Hum Rts J 83 at 104 [Orentlicher]. 
3. See e.g. UN Secretary General, Report 011 Methods of Fact-Finding (1966) 
UN Doc. A/6228, GAOR (XXI), AMexes Vol. 2, Agenda item 87; 
Orentlicher, supra note 2; H. Thoolen & B. Verstappen: Human Rights 
Missions: A Study of the Fact-Finding Practice of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (Dorderecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); R.B. Reiter, M.V. 
Zunzunegui & J. Quiroga: "Guidelines for Field Reporting of Basic Human 
Rights Violations" (1986) 8 Hum Rts Q 628; D. Weissbrodt & J. McCarthy, 
"Fact-finding by Non-Governmental Organizations" in B. Ramcharan, ed, 
lmernational Law and Fact-Finding in the Field of Human Rights 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) at 186; R. C. Blitt, "Who Will Watch 
the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the 
Case for Regulation" (2007) S Int'l J Civil Society Law 8 at 9 [Blitt]; L. 
Talsma, "U.N. Human Rights Fact-Finding: Establishing Individual 
Criminal Responsibility" (2012) 24 Fla J Int'l L 383 at 401 [Talsma]; P. 
Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights" in P. Alston, ed, The United 
Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992) at 170 [Alston]; G.M . Steinberg, A. Hertzberg & J. Berman, 
Best Practices for Human Rights and Humanitarian NGO Fact-Finding 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) [Steinberg, Hertzberg, and Berman]. 
4. Boutrouche, supra note l at 3. 
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understand IHRFF and, if necessary, stimulate its thoughtful 
reform. This article ·is a modest attempt to contribute to the 
emergent process of the renewed study of that praxis. 
As a first step, however, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the various kinds of IHRFF. As Frans Viljo~n has 
observed, one must distinguish between the types of IHRFF · 
conducted by a range of actors. 5 Viljoen is correct, for as may 
be clear to 'd1sceruing observers . of the international scene, 
. IHRFF can be co!].ducted by a UN organ (suc.h as the UN 
. Human . Rights C~~)itil), an ,.i~~~rnational NGO (such as 
\ 'Amnesty" I.nterna:tio~i."or Hwnart ·lights Watch), a IocafNGO 
'. '(such as the Atrief.iaan Civil Li~rties Union or tl}e Civil 
·. Liberties Organizit~~: of Nigeria); and an indfviduar ·state . . .._ . . 
(such as the USA ot. China). M . . Cherif Bassiouni has _even 
made hnportant dis~ctions among' the various sub-types and 
manifestations of .. :S{)ecifically UN-driven IHRFF missions 
. (based .on the ideritJiY. of the .organ that established them, the 
. ;.~ degree ·o·f supp{fr{lfut~( eajoy from the Western countries w'hich 
· hold a veto i11 the U~/ Security Council, and so on). 6 It 'is also 
possible to adopt the ~alternative (but not necessarily opposing) 
· taxonomy suggested hy Viljoen which differentiates among 
three kinds of IHRFF , namely: investigative IHRFF, indirect 
IHRFF via eX.amining state reports, and complaints-based 
IHRFF. 7 While all of these taxonomical distinctions must be 
kept in mind as . one analyzes IHRFF (principally because the 
various manifestations and types of this IHRFF are not always 
5. F. Viljoen: "Fact-Finding by UN Human Rights Complaints Bodies -
Analysis and Suggested Reforms" (2004) 8 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 49 at 54 [Viljoen). 
6. M. C. Bassiouni: "Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions" 
(2001) 5 Wash UJL & Pol'y 35 at 35 [Bassiouni). 
7. Viljoen, supra note 5. 
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identical in form and substance, and the pitfalls of one kind or 
sub-kind of IHRFF may have been overcome by another fo1m 
or sub-form of that praxis), it should be noted here that the 
focus of the analysis in this article is on investigative IHRFF 
as conducted by the UN, international NGOs, local NGOs, or 
one country (as opposed to either indirect or complaint-based 
IHRFF). 
With this in mind, the main goal of the article is to 
systematically intenogate and assess IHRFF as a form of 
praxis, and to do so from a critical third world approach to 
interm~tional law (TWAIL) perspective. To what extent (if at 
all) does IHRFF suffer from certain of the problematic features 
of general international law praxis that have been identified 
and analysed by TW AIL scholars (as well as some other 
cdtical socio-legal thinkers)? More specifically, to what extent 
(if at all) doe~ IHRFF suffer from a witting or unwitting (and 
almost always .problematic) adherence to the heaven/hell 
binary, the one-way traffic paradigm, the orientation of the 
Western gaze, colonialist styles and approaches, and other 
similarly problem<ltic methodological approaches? To what 
extent (if at all) does IHRFF suffer from a conscious or 
unconscious facilitation of or implication in the unqualified and 
univalent stigmatization of third world cultures, and from a 
tendency to engage in a conceptual "economy of 
appearances"? To what degree (if at all) has IHRFF been 
susceptible to .capture by certain formations or matrixes of 
global power? What, if any, are the implications for IHRFF of 
it being afflicted by any of these identified problems? And in 
the circumstances, what would a reasonably acceptable form of . 
IHRFF look like? In this last connection, the point is that even 
if IHRFF does not currently suffer in significant measure from 
any of the afflictions mentioned here, there may be significant 
I11tematio11al H11111a11 Rights Fact-fi11di11g Praxis 
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value in reminding those who engage in it of the need to 
become or remain as alert as they possibly can to these 
potential pitfalls. 
Since the analytical interrogation and assessment of IHRFF 
that is undertaken in this article is largely framed, shaped and 
anin1ated by a TW AIL perspective, it is important that the 
nature of that approach is outlined at the outset, albeit rather 
briefly. As I have noted elsewhere, TWAIL is an umbrella 
signifier for a broad range .of scholars who participate in what 
Makau Mutua has described as a dialectic of opposition to the 
generally unequal' unfair and unjust character of an 
international legal regime that all too often (but not always) 
helps subject the Third World to domination, subordination 
and serious disadvantage. 8 Beyond this pithy explanation, 
space constraints do not allow much more to be said here 
regarding the nature of TWAIL as a scholarly movement. In 
any case, since the nature of the TW AIL movement has been 
exhaustively adumbrated and explained in the literature, a 
detailed treatment of that definitional question should not 
detain us. Suffice it to emphasize that, as internally diverse as 
their approaches and conclusions can often be: 
TW .fi.IL scholars (or "TWAILers") are solidly 
united by a shared ethical commitment to the 
intellectual and practical struggle to expose, 
reform, or even retrench those features of the 
internatio~al legal system that help create or 
maintain the generally unequal, unfair, or unji:ist 
8. 0. C. Okafor: "Marxian Embraces (and De-Couplings) in Upendra Baxi's 
Human Rights Scholarship: A Case Study" in S. Marks, ed, lntemational 
Law 011 the Left (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 257; M. 
Mutua: "What is TWAIL?" (2000) 94 ASIL Proceedings 31. 
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global order. .. a commitment to centre the rest 
rather then merely the west, thereby taking the 
lives and experiences of those who have self-
identified as Third World much more seriously 
than has generally been the case. 9 · 
Methodologically, the analysis in article is developed via a 
step-by-step consideration of the available "primary" 10 and 
secondary evidence, in light of insig~ts . that are already 
available in the ·academic TWAIL litei~ture regarding the 
prob.l~pJ.atic features of general internat~o:ri~l iaw praxis (some 
of ~4iCh have been identified above). T..~l,.S. eyi~ence consists 
chiefly of the contents of a~tual IHRFF .,Rep0,rts (as prodll;ced 
by UN agencies or NGOs), other pertinent documents 
proct.ti~d by some of thes,e, actors (susµ·. as tQ.e "F~.cts and 
Figur~~,, document produced by the O~f(.~e·:- of ·:i:he U.N High 
Commissioner for Human Rights), and mli.terial ·that is ·already 
. .·'· 
available in academic writings on IHRFF ... ' . 
Another important methodological po fut _.is ' that ~ to the 
extent that this is even possible - it is imp~;rativ~ that scholars, 
such as myself, who largely suppor.t1tibe.· human rights · · · 
. . • . ( .. . t ·. . 
movement, maintain ~ :·· · large end\i.gh.·· measure of 
methoc;loJogical detachment when they aq~Jyze that movement 
or any aspect of it. 11 There is a great nee.c(for. those of us who 
. ' . 
9. 0. C. Okafor: "Newness, Imperialism and International Legal Reform in 
our Time: A TWAIL Perspective" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171at176. 
10. The phrase "primary evidence" refers to the reports and other documents 
produced and/or published by the UN, governments, or NGOs which we 
reviewed as part of our research. 
11. For an excellent discussion of "porosity of the border between activism and 
research," and an analysis of "the slippage between the role of the activist 
(!.Ild scholar and the impossibility of separating them," see S.E. Merry, 
"Anthropology and Activism: Researching Human Rights across Porous 
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tend to agree with Upendra Baxi (that even with all its 
problems, the movement now appears to be all that we have to 
interrogate the barbarisms of power)12 to struggle as much as 
we can to analyze that movement in as objective a manner as 
possible. This need becomes even more urgent and the task 
even more difficult, when it is realised that, as Mutua has 
noted, the movement now sits atop a very high "moral 
plateau"; 13 what Diane Orcntlichcr had referred to earlier as 
the "pr~stige" that the movement has acquired. 14 
In another methodological vein, it should also be pointed 
out here that the analysis undertaken in this article is framed to 
an important degree by both geographic and temporal 
limitations. In terms of its geographic limitation, the vast 
majority of the "primary" evidence that are relied on relate to 
IHRFF work that has been done in or with regard to some 
country or the other on the African continent. The choice to 
limit the collection and analysis of this material to those 
relating in a significant way to an African country was dictated 
by the vastness of the aggregate amount of IHRFF Reports out 
there, and the concomitant need to work with a manageable 
amount of material. This consideration also informed the 
decision to impose a temporal limitation on that evidence. As 
such the vast majority of the "primary" evidence that are 
relied on in this article are sourced from IHRFF Reports and 
other documents produced between 2008 and 2013. It is this 
Boundaries" (2008) 28 Political and Legal Anthropology Review 240 
[Merry]. 
12. U. Baxi: Tire Future of Human Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2006) at 4 [Baxi, "Future of Human Rights"]. 
13. M. Mutua: Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: 
University of Philadelphia Press, 2002) at 40. 
14. Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 83. 
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admittedly geographically and temporally limited collection of 
evidence and data that constitute the bulk of the primary 
material that is subjected to a TWAIL analysis in this article. 
In order to facilitate the systematic conduct of this 
analytical exercise, the article is organized into four major 
segments, this introduction included. Following this 
introductory section, section II examines the available 
evidence, data and scholarly insights in order to help decipher 
the extent (if any) to which more contemporary IHRFF praxis 
is afflicted (or not afflicted) by one or more of the problematic 
characteristics . or tendencies of international law praxis that 
TWAIL scholars have long identified and discussed. Following 
this fairly extensive analysis, an attempt is made in section III 
to reflect on the lessons which ought to be learnt there from. 
The main question that is asked and addressed in this section is 
what should IHRFF become, if its potential is to be fully 
realised? Section IV concludes the article. 
Viewing IHRFF from a TW AIL Perspective 
This section is devoted to an analysis of more contemporary 
IHRFF praxis from a TW AIL perspective. The main question 
here is the extent to which IHRFF praxis is afflicted (if at all) 
by any of tl1e problematic features of international law praxis 
identified in the introductory section of this article. To this 
end, the rest of the section is sub-divided into eight sub-
sections, each devoted to a consideration of IHRFF in the light 
of TW AIL or similarly critical insights regarding one such 
problematic· characteristic or tendency. These problematic 
characteristics and tendencies are: the heaven/hell binary, the 
one-way traffic paradigm, fixation on the orientation of the 
Western ·gaze, adherence to colonialist styles and approaches, 
adherence to other problematic methodological approaches, the 
/11ternatio11al Human Rig/us Fact-finding Praxis 
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unqualified and univalent stigmatization of third world 
cultures, engagement in a conceptual "economy of 
appearances," and susceptibility to capture by certain 
formations or matrixes of global power. 
The Heavcn/Ifoll Dinary 
TW AIL scholars have long critiqued the tendency of 
international human rights praxis and discourse to foster and 
reproduce a binary dichotomy tha.t ruptures the globe into two 
conceptual communities, the one "heavenly" and the other 
"liellish"; 15 a dichotomy that draws fairly neat and bright lines 
between "the Good West" and "the bad Third World. "16 These 
scholars have also shown not just that this binary is in fact not 
based on fully appreciated reality, 17 but that it is also harmful 
to the human rights struggle (e.g. by facilitating a human 
rights monologue rather than a dialogue, and helping to foster 
15. See 0. C. Okafor & S. C. Agbakwa: "Re-Imagining International Human 
Rights Education in Our Time: Beyond Three Constitutive Orthodoxies" 
(2001) 14 Leiden J Int'l L 563 at 566-573 (Okafor & Agbakwa, "Re-
Imagining"]. See also M. Mutua, "Savages, Victims and Saviors: The 
Metaphor of Human Rights" (2001) 42 Harvard Int'l LJ 201 [Mutua, 
"Savages"); Baxi, "Future of Human Rights''., supra note 12; U. Baxi, "'A 
Work in Progress'?: The United States' Report to the United Nations' 
Human Rights Committee" (1995) 35 Indian Journal of International Law 34 
[Baxi, "Work in Progress"]; U. Baxi, "Random Reflections on the 
[Im]possibility of Human Rights, online: 
ltttp://www.pdl1re.org/dialog11elrejlectio11s.lu111l [Baxi, "Random 
Reflections"); P. Houtondji, "The Master's Voice - Remarks on the 
Problem of Human Rights in Africa" in UNESCO, Pltilosopltical 
Fo1111datio11s of H11111a11 Rigltts (Paris: UNESCO, 1986) at 320 [Houtondji]. 
16. See 0 . C. Okafor, "On the Patchiness, Promise and Perils of "Global" 
Human Rights Law", 2011 Diaspora Scholars Lecture at the Nigerian 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, Nrgeria at 47. 
17. See e.g. Okafor & Agbakwa, "Re-Imagining", supra note 15 at 571; Baxi, 
"Work in Progress", supra note 15 at 39. 
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or augment alienation from the human rights struggle which 
impedes efforts at generating a measure of mass cultural 
legitimacy for the human rights project). 18 However, as the 
TW AIL and other critical literature has convincingly 
established the existence of this binary and persuasively 
demonstrated its negative effects on the human rights struggle 
in general, the re-development of these twin arguments will 
neither occupy nor detain us here. Rather , what is focused 
upon in this section is , in the main, an analysis of IHRFF 
(which is itself only one aspect/dimension of human rights 
praxis) in order to decipher the extent .to which it participates . 
in the (re)production of this problematic heaven/hell binary. A 
concomitant issue is the degree to which IHRFF thinkers and , 
practitioners ought to remain alert - even in this day and age - · 
to the danger of their participation in its reproduction. 
What therefore does the available evidence and analysis 
suggest about IHRFF praxis' relationship to the heaven/hell 
binary? Does IHRFF praxis help at all to (re)produce this neat 
dichotomy and differentiate in the result between a virtually 
"innocent West" and a neat-absolutely "savage Third World"? 
One major way in which IHRFF praxis could help (re)produce 
this heaven/hell binary is through a disproportionate· 
concentration of its activities or operations in the Third World, 
while focusing relatively little attention on the Western and the 
most powerful states. 19 This all-too-often leaves the impression. 
in the undiscerning mind that there was very little, if any, real . ... 
necessity to focus on IHRFF on the Western or most powerful 
states. In other words, the impression is left that these states 
escaped IHRFF scrutiny largely because they are in fact "good 
18. See Okafor & Agbakwa: "Re-Imagining" 1 supra note 15 at 573. 
19. Many in government circles in the USA have even tended to suggest that 
this should be the case. See Baxi: "Work in Progress", supra note 15. 
.: . 
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states" that are squeaky clean in the relevant respects. The 
available evidence suggests that the IHRFF praxis of the major 
international NGOs is much more globally-focused today than 
was the case a decade or two ago. 20 Even the unil~teral 
IHRFF of certain countries (especially the USA) are fairly 
global in ambition - excepting the fact that they do not tend to 
pay attention to the specks in their own eyes. 21 While a 
statistical survey of t~~e number of UN IHRFF missions sent to 
developed. and/or very powerful countries as . compared . to 
those ·sent to the weaker Third World states does not indicate 
that this bias is as present 'today in UN IHRFF praxis as it 
once appeared to b~, the very fact th~t a nuge majority of such 
missions/reports target Third World states can function to 
leave the not entirely accurate impression in the minds of all-
too-many observers. that serious human rights violations almost 
always occur in Thir~ World .states, thereby crowding out 
from their minds the pictures of the violations that do occur in 
and by the more powe~ful states .22 Perhaps more importantly, 
20. See e.g.. Amnesty Intcrpatkmal, State of the World's Human Rights Report, 
2012 (London: Anutes~y International 2012) (which focuses on stronger and 
weaker, Westcrn-and .. non-Wcstcm, countries alike). 
21. See e.g. U.S. Department of State, Coun(ly Reports on Human Rig/its 
Practices for 2012, onlinc: 
http://ww1v.state.gov/j/drllrls/hrrptihu111a11riglltsreportl#wrapper; Human 
Rights Record of tile United States iu 2012, .online: 
lwp://11ews.xi11/111a11et . .com/e11glish/world/20l 3-04/21 le 132327175 2. lltm. 
22. A review of the. data on reports and missions sent bY the UN to various 
states between. 2008-201'2 sugges.ts that 14 of the 276 missions/reports 
(S.07%) targeted the five veto-power wielding PS states (a proxy for the 
most powerful states), which constitute roughly 2.S9% of the 193 states UN 
states; SL of the 276 missions/reports ( 18.48%) targeted states which belong 
to the group of non-PS <Jeveloped states, which make up roughly 18.13 % of 
UN states; and -211 of the 276 missions/reports (76.4S%) targeted the 
weaker non-PS Third World states, which make up roughly 79.28% of UN 
states. Now, of cours_e, an analysis regarding the rate of incidence of 
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other statistical measures suggest that the heaven/hell binary 
may still be as strongly supported by UN-driven IHRFF praxis 
as ever. 23 
Another major way in which IHRFF helps (re)producc U1is 
heaven/hell binary is through the all-too-frequent failure to 
foreground Third World's contributions to, or excellence/ 
leadership in, the development of or respect for certain human 
rights norms, while highlighting constantly the admittedly 
numerous instances of the violation of human rights by Third 
World states. For example, how many IHRFF efforts or 
reports, if any, have been devoted to the documentation of pro-
human rights third world cultural forms and praxis?24 To what 
extent has IHRFF recorded and disseminated the fact that 
Rwanda (and not the USA or Britain) holds the all-time world 
record for the actual implementation of gender equality in 
representation in Parliament;25 or that Lhe Seychelles, Senegal, 
(serious) human rights violations (at best a massive task) might yield a 
different perspective. But this analysis suffices to give a sense of the 
intensity or otherwise of focus of UN-driven IHRFF on certain groupings of 
states. 
23. For example, of the sixteen (16) countries to which country-specific 
rapporteurs (who engage in fact-finding) were appointed by the UN Human 
Rights Council between 2008 and 2013, only one (Belarus). i.e. 6.25%, 
could be viewed as a non-Third World state, meaning that a whopping 
92.75% were Third World countries. Considering thal the appointment of a 
country-specific rapporteur in respect of a country is one of the strongest 
measures that the Human Rights Council takes against human rights 
violating states, this statistic is tell ing. 
24. As is discussed later, a recent attempt to do so by the UN Human Rights 
Council, through its Advisory Committee, was strongly opposed and treated 
with great suspicion by many Western Governments and NGOs, including 
some International NGOs. 
25. Women hold 64% of the seats in Rwanda's current Parliament. See Atlanta 
Blackstar, onl ine: /Jttp://atlantablackstar.com/2013110/ 12/nva11das-
parlia111e111-has-tfle-higflest-fe11tale-repres11wtio11-of-any-11atio11-011-earthl; 
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South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania , Uganda, and Angola 
have all far outpaced most non-Scandinavian Western countries 
(and certainly the USA) in this same regard? 26 Why does 
Nigeria's inunense contribution (given its meagre resources 
relative to \Vestern countries) to the human rights project of 
restoring peace and saving millions of lives in the West 
African sub-region and beyond tend to be either ignored, or 
highlighted in the negative, in the dominant human rights-
related commentaries, usually whe1' abuses are committed by 
some of its troops?27 These sorts of silences, or at best, low 
decibel acknowledgements, amidst the incessant loudness of 
the constant highlighting of Third World human rights 
violations all-too-often helps give the impression that the Third 
World is almost always a kind of human rights desert, where 
very little, if any, thirsting for dignity or freedom is quenched, 
and a kind of near-absolutely benighted region of our world. 
And so when what is almost always fore-grounded by IHRFF 
is the "hellish" portion of the Third World picture, and what is 
constantly back-grounded is the "heavenly" portion of that 
picture, the impression of the Third World as a near-absolute 
human rights hell is (re)produced, and when this is contrasted 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, "Women in National Parliaments," online: 
http://www. ipu. orp,lw11111-elclassif.l1r111. 
26. Ibid. 
27. See 0. C. Okafor: "Book Review of Charlotte Ku and Harold Jacobson, 
eds., Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law" 
(2004) UBC L Rev 547. See also I. A. Abdulwaheed: "Nigeria and 
Peacekeeping Process in Africa: The Darfur Peace Process in Sudan" (2012} 
3 International Journal of Politics and Good Governance l at 3; L. A. 
Horvitz & C. Catherwood, Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide (New 
York: Infobase, 201 l); G. Sanghera, M. Henry & P. Higate: "Peacekeepers 
as New Men? Security and Masculinity in the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia" (SPAIS, University of Bristol, Working Article No. 02-08) at 10. 
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with the extensive fore-grounding of the heavenly aspects of 
the Western picture, the heaven/hell binary takes firm root. 
The One-Way Traffic Paradigm . 
As a related point, TWAIL scholars have also shown that a 
. logical end-product of a conceptualization of the human rights 
situation around the world in ways that are framed by a near-
absolutist heaven/hell binary is the adherence of international 
human rights praxis to the one-way traffic paradigm in which 
human rights knowledge, scrutiny and supervision tends to 
flow from those parts of the world (i.e. the West) which 
supposedly invented human rights, which know almost 
everything about it already, and which observe it almost to the 
letter, in the direction of those regions of the world (i.e. the 
Third World) which apparently did not invent human rights, 
which tend to know very little - if anything - about it, and 
which hardly ever observe it. 28 It has also been pointed out in 
support of this argument that the US State Department 
prepares IHRFF Reports on other countries but not on itself;29 
that international human r ights programs and clinics in North 
America tend to focus heavily on the Third World and not on 
their own countries;30 and that the USA at one extreme rarely 
28. See Okafor & Agbakwa, "Re-Imagining", supra note 15 at 575. See also 
Mutua, "Savages", supra note 15; Baxi, "Future of Human Rights", supra 
note 12; Baxi, "Work in Progress", supra note 15; Baxi, "Random 
Reflections", supra note 15; Houtondji, supra note 15. 
29. See J. Enns, "Research Memorandum on US Department of State Human 
Rights Reports," 16 September 2013 (prepared for and on file with the 
author). See also Baxi, "Work in Progress", supra note 15. · 
30. See T. Ezer & S. Deller Ross "Fact-Finding as a Lawmaking Tool for 
Advancing Women's Human Rights" (2006) 7 Geo J of Gender & L 331; J. 
Bond, "Global Classroom: International Human Rights Fact-Finding as 
Clinical Method, The" (2001) 28 Wm Mitchell L Rev 317 at 320. Contra 
Okafor & Agbakwa, "Re-Imagining", supra note 15 at 566. 
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thinks of itself as a proper candidate for IHRFF or other 
scrutiny. 31 
What then is IHRFF praxis, specific relationship to this 
kind of one-way traffic paradigm? Does IHRFF praxis help 
(re)produce this paradigm? One accusation that has been 
historically levelled against IHRFF is that it tended to exist in 
a kind of geo-stationary orbit above the Third World (relative 
to the degree of attention paid to scrutinizing Western or 
others among. the most powerful states); and that mainstream . 
IHRFF tended to focus to a disproportionate degree on Third 
World countries. 32 As we have seen, IHRFF is no longer 
nearly as disproportionately focused on the Third World as it 
once was, although it still does function to an extent to help 
create the impression that the Third World is a human rights 
"hell" while the West is a human rights "heaven''. However, 
as this argument has been developed in the last sub-section, 
that analysis will not be repeated here. Suffice it to add that the 
reason this one way traffic persists today (however attenuated 
in degree) goes beyond the operation and effects of heaven/hell 
binary, and extends to the effects of the power asymmetries 
that deeply mark and characterise the relationships among 
Western and Third World peoples. For example, if Third 
World subalterns could speak, if they could autlior the 
dominant human rights narratives, how would we see the 
human rights situation in many Western states? And would not 
more human rights knowledge flow from the Third World 
toward the West? 
It must also be noted that, in any case, whatever the 
accuracy of the first point above, it is incontrovertible that 
31. See Baxi, "Work in Progress", supra note 15. 
32. See Okafor & Agbakwa: "Re-Imagining", supra note 15. 
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there is thus far very little, if any, IHRFF traffic that 
originates from the weaker (almost all Third World) states and 
flows in the direction of the richer and stronger (mostly 
Western and PS) states. Nigeria.n or Senegalese NGOs rarely, 
if ever , undertake IHRFF in or about the USA or France; but 
the reverse occurs near-incessantly . For the reasons that have 
already been offered in Lhe last sub-section, the much more 
diverse way in which the UN does its own IHRFF softens, but 
does not totally blunt this critique. 
The problems with this kind of one-way IHRFF traffic are 
myriad, but only t~o will be addressed here. The first is that 
its underlying assumptions (that human rights scrutiny and 
knowledge only need to flow largely in one pre-determined 
direction) are factually flawed, and seriously so. The second is 
that it helps to fos ter a racialized hierarchy in which Third 
World societies are endemically and perpetually viewed as the 
sites of human rights violations and investigations, and Third 
World peoples are not adequately appreciated as agents of 
human rights knowledge production, fact-finding, and 
dissemination. Conversely, it tends to deprive the West of a 
flow of human rights knowledge and example from the Third 
World that could benefit it tremendously. For example, what 
might US women (and even men) have learnt or benefited 
from the remarkable Rwandan example of actual gender equity 
in political representation? 
Captivation by the Or ientation of the Western Gaze 
TW AIL scholars have long identified and critiqued the 
disproportionately constitutive role that the ipse dixit or gaze 
of Europeans and other Westerners 33 tends to have on the 
33. Just as there is no monolithic Third World, there is, of course, no 
monolithic West or Europe, and internal dissent and divisions characterize 
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perceived legitimacy or otherwise of Third World statehood, 
governance, and practices34 A similar argument ~an be made 
with respect to IHRFF praxis. Here, the first contention is that 
the orientation of the "Western gaze" tends to determine, for 
the most part, the perceived need for, and legitimacy . of, 
IHRFF. It is wherever the Western eye goes, on whatever 
location its lenses are trained, and whatever it sees, that tends 
to motivate, frame, constitute and legitimize IHRFF. Whatever 
the Western eye does not see, is not pr:imed to see, or regards 
with studied ignorance, does not tend to motivate, frame, 
constittite and legitimize IHRFF. In other contexts, some· have 
alluded to the agenda setting power of the so-called "CNN 
effect" (one which is beginning to be countered and balanced 
by the emerging "J\l Jazeera effect"). 35 J\nd so the massive 
dispossession of black Africans from their lands that continues 
to haunt life in much of Southern Africa, the brutalization and 
killing of minorities in highly significant numbers in the inner 
cities of the USA, the deplorable conditions in which 
those regions of the world as much as anywhere else. As such, "Western" 
and "European" is used here only as a shorthand for the dominant segments 
of the populations of those regions. 
34. For example, see O.C. Okafor, Re-Defining legitimate Statehood: 
l11tematio11al Law and State Frag111ematio11 in Africa (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2000); T. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
!111ematio11al Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); M. 
Mutua: "The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: J\n 
Evaluation of the Language of Duties" (1995) 35 Va J Int'l L 339 [Mutua, 
"The Banjul Charter"]. 
35. See S. Livingston, "Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media 
Effects According to the Type of Military Intervention," Working Article, 
Ke1U1edy School of Government, Harvard University, 1997; B. Bahador, 
Tile CNN Effect in Action: How the New Media Pushed the West toward War 
in Kosovo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); M.E. Zingarelli, The 
CNN Effect and tile Al Jazeera Effect in Global Politics and Society (MA 
Thesis, Georgetown University, 8 April 2010). 
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indigenous North Americans actually live (amidst some of the 
highest standards of living in the world), or even the socio-
economic rights violations that many MNCs perpetrate almost 
at will in the Third World, have traditionally not tended to 
motivate, frame, constitute or legitimjze IHRFF in nearly as 
much measure as (admittedly equally important) issues such as 
torture, freedom of expression, liberty rights, and so on. 
It is also important to underlie the fact that a related way 
in which the Western gaze exerts power and influence over 
IHRFF praxis is ideational. Whatever the Western eye 
recognizes as a violation of human rights t~nds to become 
widely recognized as such, and whoever the Western eye sees 
as a pariah, as the "bad guy,,, tends to become widely viewed 
as such, and is more likely to attract mainstream IHRFF. It is · 
thus no wonder that, as we have seen, all but one of the 
sixteen countries that were subjected to IHRFF by UN Human 
Rights Council-appointed country rapporteurs between 2008-
2013 are Third World states. And while this is on its own not 
a dispositive fact, it is worthy of note that almost every one of 
the persons appointed as country rapporteurs in respect of 
those states during the same period hail3 from, grew up in, 
was trained in, or lives or works in a Western country. Tills is 
so despite the fact that they are overwhelmingly citizens of 
Third World states. Here, it does not matter that Third World 
states in fact make up the majority of the membership of the . 
Human Rights Council or the bulk of its country-rapporteurs. 
The point here is the ideational power of the Western gaze and . . 
perspective, its power to dominate the construction of the 
real.ity that is then taken as a given by others. Conversely, 
whatever the Western eye recognizes as respect for human 
rights tends to become widely recognized as such, and 
whoever the Western eye sees as a human rights champion, as 
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the "good guy," tends to become widely viewed as such, and 
is less likely to attract IHRFF. Thus, for example, European 
land grabs in Southetn Africa and the continued control of 
those highly coveted lands by people of European-descent too 
often to the serious socio-economic detriment of most of the 
population - is scafcely seen as an egregious or even serious 
human rights 'violalio11; the re-distribution of such lands is 
rarely viewed · ~s ·a:"~fohJ.1 of respect for human rights; · the 
European power$ wli~.- seized those lands in the first pl~ce are 
hardly seen as bad gµys; and tb.e gpvernments that wa~t to re-
. distribute the. lartds~":are rarely .\·J~ed as good guys. :· This 
.:-; ideational effect ·o(the . orierit~tiqn of the Western gaze in turn 
· determines to a lar~·~degrce where IHRFF focuses· its attention 
and wbere it travels:· .. The perceived good guys tend to escape 
tough scrutiny while -the appai;ent bad guys tend to attract it. 
It should of course be admitted th~t IHRFF praxis 
conducted by . Ill:aiiy ""UN bodies, such as the Human Rights 
:. Council (HRC)~ is in-. general, hardly guilty of being captivated 
. by . the Western gaz~: The new system of universal periodic 
.. review has helped· significantly to dull (though not deaden) the 
··effect of the Western gaze on the HRC's praxis. 36 What is 
more, the majority Third World composition of that body has 
ensured that many otherwise marginalized human rights 
concerns (such as the human rights implications of toxic waste 
dumping, foreign debt, paying ransoms to hostage-takers, and 
the ways ui which cultural values.can support lhe human rights 
project) have received at least some degree of IHRFF 
36. For the nature and features of the new system of UPR, sec E.D. Redondo, 
"The Universal Periodic Review - Is There Life Beypnd Naming and 
Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?" (2012) 4 NZL Rev 
(forthcoming), reproduced online: 
lrttp:l/articles.ssmlso! 3/articles. cfm ?abstract _id== 2111607 [Redondo]. 
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attention. 37 But HRC-mandated IHRFF on many of these issues 
are too often opposed or treated dismissively by far-too-many 
of the Western states and experts, who despite their fewer 
numbers remain disproportionately influential. 38 
The Unqualified and Univalent Stigmatization of Third 
World Cultures 
TWAIL and certain other critical scholars have convincingly 
critiqued as seriously flawed and problematic the way in which 
mainstream international human rights discourse has 
traditionally treated "culture", especially the local cultures of 
third world societies, as if they have "a fixed retrograde 
valency. " 39 According to these scholars, since every cultural 
tradition - more or less - contains within it some norms and 
institutions that violate human rights as well as others that are 
37. For example, see the study conducted by the Human Rights Council 
Advisory Committee (HRCAC) on the highly controversial issue of 
"Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better 
Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind", pursuant to Human 
Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/16/3 of 8th April 2011. The 
.i:iecessity for this study was apparent to almost all Third World States and 
some others, but it was opposed to varying degrees by most Western 
countries and most NGOs. Indeed, many experts on the HRCAC expressed 
strong reservations about studying the matter at all. The HRCAC's Report 
on this study is documented as UN Doc. A/HRC/22/71, of 6 December 
2012 [UN Doc.A/HRC/22171]. 
38. Ibid. Here, the author relies in part on is own personal observations as ~ 
member of the HRCAC. 
39. See C. Nyamu: "How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to 
Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries" 
(2000) 41 Harv Int' l U 381 [Nyamu]; Mutua: "The Banjul Charter", supra 
note 34; · 0. C. Okafor: "Attainments, Eclipses and Disciplinary Renewal· in 
International Human Rights Law: A Critical Overview" in D . Armstrong, 
ed, Routledge Handbook of I111ernational Law (London: Routledge, 2009) at 
307 [Okafor, "Attainments"]; and A. Riles, "Anthropology, Human Rights 
and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage" (2004) 15 Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law 9 [Riles]. 
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supportive of human rights, it does not make sense to 
stigmatize culture (especially those of Third World societies) 
in a near-absolute, univalent and unqualified way, as almost 
always violative of human rights, as more or less bad for 
human dignity , as obstacles to be surmouuted, or as a huge 
part of the problem. Yet, this remains the dominant tendency 
in international human rights discourse today. 40 Rarely is 
culture imagined as an important part of the solution. 41 
Something constructed . as "culture" is too often opposed 
squarely to something imagined as "human rights ;" as if 
human rights are somehow culture-free and cultures are 
somehow human rights free. 42 And yet, the conferment of 
widespread cultural legitimacy on the human rights project has 
been increasingly recognized as necessary precondition for the 
abridgmeut of the wide gap between theory and practice in 
international human rights law, and the fostering of widespread 
everyday respect for human rights .43 And without finding the 
40. The discussion in note 37 and the accompanying text regarding the uproar 
among Western states and NGOs that followed the conferment of the 
mandate on the HRCAC to study the ways and means of "Promoting Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Detter Understanding of 
Traditional Values of Humankind" is illustrative here. The dominant current 
in the contributions to the debate on the mandate of those who opposed it 
was a near-absolute suspicion and characterization of culture as the enemy of 
human rights. The HRCAC's report, however, attempted to dispel this 
notion in part. See UN Doc. A/HRC/22171, supra no1e 37. 
41. See Nyamu, supra note 39 at 392; Okafor, "Attainments," supra note 39. 
42. Ibid. 
43 Sec D. Bell: 111e East Asian Challenge for H11111a11 Righrs (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Pres, 1999); A.A. An'im: Human -Righrs in Cross-
Cul!ural Perspectives: A Quesr for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1995); J . Donnelly, "The Relative Universality of 
Human Rights" (2007) 29 Hum Rts Q 281; P.T. Zeleza: "The Struggle for 
Human Rights in Africa" in P.T. Ze!eza & P.J. McConnaughay, eds, 
Human Rig/us, The Rule of Law, and Develop111enr in Africa (Philadelphia: 
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spaces that local cultural contexts provide for the advancement 
of the human rights project, this task will be much harder, if 
not practically impossible. 44 
As might be expected, IHRFF has not been immune to 
infection by this virus. As Baxi has observed, we do not as a 
community "know enough beyond the 'myth' of the noble 
savage in what and which ways a peoples' knowledge systems 
are more conducive to the creation /sustenance of human right$ 
cultures." 45 Yet, IHRFF has not tended to focus on this 
question; it has not turned its attention to learning from the 
subaltern natives what in their Ctlltural traditions promotes or 
protect (or could be deployed to promote or protect) human 
rights in their own societies and local contexts. IHRFF has 
tended to concentrate on the things we know much about 
already, but not on the things we do not k!1ow much about a~ 
yet, such as the pro-human rights local cultures of Third 
World peoples. Similarly, as a form of praxis that is basically .: .. 
designed to locate and di$.seminate information about hm:µan 
rights violations around the world, IHRFF has .understandably 
tended to focus on human rights violation$ in the Third World, 
and not on the contributions made to Qie.~hu111an rights project .. ·, 
by Third World countries and their pe.QRles. Iii these ways, - .; 
mostly through the "gaping" ~nd "loud"· .silences it authors, 
IHRFF helps create a wjdespread sens~ ~nd · experience of " 
Third World Cultures as unqualifiedly . and monolithically 
harmful to human rights. 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Okafor, "Attainments," supra note 
39. 
44. Nyamu, supra note 39 at 417; Okafor, "Attainments," supra note 39 at 308. 
45. Baxi, "Random Reflections," supra note 15 at 2; Baxi, "Future of Human 
Rights," supra note 12 . 
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The Production of a Conceptual "Economy of 
A p pearauces" 
Here, the question is the extent to which the dominant forms of 
IHRFF do what the critical socio-legal scholar Kamari Clarke 
accuses (international) law of doing in other contexts, i.e. 
engagement in the production of a conceptual "economy of 
appearances" in which a person, group , or country is featured 
as a culprit (or human rights violator) without necessarily 
fingerin,g the full cycle of consumption, exploitation, apuse, 
and so on, that fed or feed the chain of events that ultimately 
produced the violation. 46 The question is whether when 
. persons engaged in IHRFF conduct an investigation for a 
· · limited number of days in a country (as they tend to do), do 
' · fue practical economies of time and knowledge (the little time 
_:..:. ·available and the lack of in-depth knowledge of the history and 
.. · context) that frame their mission tend to impose a problematic 
.... '. or even harmful conceptual economy of appearances that de-
."-,. contextualizes and therefore distorts their understanding of the 
, : situation that is subject to IHRFF? One way to relate this point 
·;. ~o real life is by invoking the issue of land reform and re-
. ." 4.istribution in places like Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South 
· Africa .. For example, why is there a heavy focus (and at times 
·· almost exclusively) on the contemporary suffering of scores or 
hundreds of dispossessed white farmers and far less (if at all) 
on the centuries-long dispossession and suffering of millions of 
black Zimbabweans? 47 The two kinds of suffering arc 
important, but why displace this last kind of suffering to a 
large degree and concentration with the first kind of suffering? 
Why not focus on the "full cycle'', a methodology that would 
46. K.M. Clarke: "The Rule of Law through its Economy of Appearances" 
(2011) 18 Ind J Global Legal Stud 7 at 12. 
47. See Okafor, "Attairunents," supra now 39. 
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portray a more accurate story of initial dispossession leading to 
the on-going restitutive re-possession? However, even when 
IHRFF has attempted to focus on the full cycle, it does not, in 
my view, do it in a satisfactory way. 48 
A Colonialist Style and Approach'? 
As commentators who work in a range of approaches 
(including TWAIL Scholars) have long agreed, no asset is 
more important to a human rights fact-finder than the 
credibility of her report and her reputation for meticulous 
methodology . . 49 Indeed, with regard to NGOs (be these 
international or local) it is quite correct to conclude, as Diane 
Orentlicher has, "the credibility of their fact finding is their 
stock-in-trade." 50 This is one reason that when it comes to 
IHRFF, the robustness, meticulousness and acceptability of its 
methodology matter so much that the praxis has often· "come 
under scrutiny, and at times attack," and should continue to be 
subject to rigorous evaluation and critique. 51 Another reason 
for placing IHRFF's methodologies under our watchful eyes is 
that, needless to say, the conclusions drawn by those who 
conduct IHRFF often have important (and even serious) 
consequences for the countries affected, especially when they 
are weaker Third World states. For example, such states could 
find themselves relegated to a pariah status, the financial aid 
they receive could be withdrawn, and invasions could be· 
autl10riscd or otherwise undertaken against them. 52 H is of 
48. ibid. 
49. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 85; M. Mutua, "The Politics of Human 
Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist Paradigm in Africa" (1996) 17 Mich J Int'l 
591; Blitt, supra note 3 at 9; Boutrouche, supra note lat 2. 
50. Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 92. 
51. Ibid at 85. 
52. Ibid at 84. 
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course trne that many govermnents, fearful of these kinds of 
consequences, may have a strong incentive to discredit NGO-
produced or other kinds of IHRFF Reports, but this realization 
should not lead scholars and practitioners of international 
human rights law alike to give IHRFF a free pass on 
methodological rigour and acceptability. 
In this sub-section, the first set of methodological critiques 
of IHRFF is developed, albeit briefly. These critiques are 
based on those aspects of IHRFF methodologies which, in one 
way or another, tend to remind a TW AIL scholar , like myself, 
of fue colonialist style/approach to treatment of Thii-d World 
states, accompanied by all of its well-known problems. The 
first such critique is that, all-too-often, IHRFF is undertaken 
either at too high an orbit above the relevant Third World state 
and/or from too far a distance; and that this is still apparent 
even when the IHRFF includes some kind of field work or 
mission component. This tends to remind one of the TWAIL 
critique of the problematic way in which Europeans made and 
re-made Africa into whatever they wished (at least initially) 
largely through reading maps rather than through meeting 
chaps - a theme that has been developed extensively 
elsewhere.53 With regards to IHRFF, the issue is that, all-too-
often, important conclusions are reached and weighty 
allegations made against a Third World (or other relevant) 
state with either no visit at all to the state/location in question, 
or (as is now more typical) with too short a visit, resulting in 
allegations that are either de-contextualized or significantly 
misleading~ or both. My analysis of the available eviden~e 
53. See O.C. Okafor: Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: /11/emational Law and 
State Fragmentation in Africa (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000). See 
also J. Hargreaves: "The Making of the Boundaries" in A. I. Ashiwaju, ed., 
Pa11i1io11ed Africans (London: C. Hurst, 1985) at 23. 
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suggests that, on average, UN IHRFF missions tend to last one 
week; 54 international NGO IHRFF missions (such as those 
undertaken by Amnesty International) tend to last longer··. 
(which is a very good thing) but are sometimes still largely : · 
based on reporting from afar; 55 and that although the US State 
Department's annual IHRFF Reports are based to son~e extent ·. : . 
on reporting by their staff on-the-ground, too often staff did · · 
.not appear to have spent adequate rime in the particul~(· 
places/regions within the relevant country that they are 
reporting on. 56 What is more striking is that too many of these 
US State Department Reports are often hea.vily based on arms- . 
length reporting that is grounded on third party reporting · ·' : -: 
(which is often not based on a sustained study on-th~:·_: .. ·. :. 
ground). 57 If one was to be less charitable, they might even .. · .. · 
describe this kind of IHRFF as "drive-by," or better still, "fly- · 
by" IHRFF. Yet, even the International Bar Association's 
Fact-Finding Guidelines implores international human rights 
.fact-finders, such as NGOs, to consider the importance of in-.;· . 
country (i.e. local) knowledge in designing their IHRFF. 55 · ' 
However , sufficient local knowledge (especially about the.· 
many complex societies which are often the focus of IHRFF) '. 
cannot be acquired in the typical one-week missions that the 
54. See J. Enns: "Research Memorandum on UN IHRFF Reports," 16 
September 20 13 (prepared for and on file with the author). 
55. See J. Enns, "Research Memorandum on Amnesty fnlcrnational's IHRFF 
Reports," ·16 September 2013 (prepared for and on file with the author); and 
J. Enns, "Research Memorandum on Human Rights Watch's IHRFF 
Reports, " 16 September 2013 (prepared for and on file with the author). 
56. See J. Enns, "Research Memorandum on the US Department of State's 
IHRFF Reports," 16 September 2013 (prepared for and on file with the 
author). 
57. Ibid. 
58. See International Bar Association and The Raoul Wallcnberg Institute, supra 
note 1, at 3. 
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UN and many other organizations undertake, and this would 
hold true regardless of the number of weeks spent reading 
literature on the relevant country, and the extent of reliance on 
"native informants." 59 Reliance on satellite imagery cannot 
cure this effect entirely, and may actually reinforc~ the "maps 
rather than chaps" sentiment and substance of such IHRFF. Of 
course, satellite imagery can, depending on the context, serve 
as suppl~mental evi.dence (as long as a strong emphasis is 
placed On the . worcf'. "supplemental"), GO but this cannot really 
replace ethnographic best practices such as sustained studies 
on-the-ground. · 
What is more, even when IHRFF is based substantially on 
· some kind of field-wo.rk in the relevant place, it is still possible 
to quarrel with certain aspects of the provenance, design and 
approach of such missions as perhaps unwittingly reproducing 
a colonialist style and approach. For one, there is too often a 
high degree of power asymmetry between the observer and the 
observed, between the fact-finders and their (usually Third 
World) subjects or targets. The fact-finder is usually in a 
significantly more powerful socio-political, discursive, and 
economic position than the subjects of the IHRFF mission. 
This is clearly so with regard to IHRFF that is conducted by 
very powerful states such as the USA in the generally much 
weaker Third World countries. This is also a concern with UN 
IHRFF, because despite the balanced geographical 
representation that tends to characterize its IHRFF teams, the 
UN is still in a significant position of power relative to the 
59. B. Bukovska: "Perpetrating Good: Unintended Consequences of 
International Human Rights Advocacy" (2008) 9 Int'l JHR 7 at 11 
[Bukovska]. 
60. See P. Alston and C. Gillespie: "Global Human Rights Monitoring, New 
Technologies, and the Politics of Information" (2012) 23 EHL 1089 at 1113. 
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weaker Third World states and peoples. However, this concern 
may be less salient with regards to international NGOs, 
although it is still a significant concern vis:.a-vis their 
relationships with the local NGOs (which ·are usually more 
ideationally, financially and socially subordinate) and 
activists. 61 This kind of power asymmetry may foster au 
atmosphere of undue deference to the fact-finder in which 
(through no fault of the fact-finder) the "native informant" 
feels too beholden, subordinated or intimidated to question the 
fact-finder and leads the team towards what the informant 
thinks the team wa\1ts to see or hear, resulting in bias in the 
inexorably large qualitative conclusions drawn by an IHRFF 
mission. Importantly, rather than eliminating or reducing the 
relations of power and domination that the Third World natives 
often experience, this kind of power asymmetry may actually 
reinforce and augment it, albeit in a different way. 62 It is for 
such reasons that critical anthropologists and even some 
international lawyers have long warned against a lack of 
alertness to the negative effects of the "power-dynamics of the 
researcher-subject interaction" and "the relationship of 
inequality between the observer and the observed," such as the 
"the power of the researcher to construct the story. "63 
Another such methodological problem is that IHRFF 
missions to Third World states tend to be either heavily 
composed of Western or Western-trained fact-finders, or 
undertaken under the ultimate direction of people of this 
background. 64 This may, in Mutua's now famous metaphor, 
61. See e.g. O.C. Okafor: Legitimizing Human Rigflrs NGOs: Lessons from 
Nigeria (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2006) al 123-150. 
62. See Bukovska, supra nole 59 at 8. 
63 . See Merry, supra note 11 at 241. See also Viljoen, supra note 5 al 52. 
64. As has been previously noted, all but one UN country rapporteur in office 
between 2008 and 2013 was a Western national, lived and worked in the 
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evoke the image in some observers and produce the experience 
in some participants, of the Western or Westernized "savioµr" 
looking to find facts from the locals in order to author a script 
that will lead to the rescue of Third World "victims" from 
their own "savages"; a familiar colonialist relational 
st1ucture. 65 There are, of course, all kinds of problems with 
this type of relationship, but suffice it to say that at the very 
least, it can bias fact-finding results by imposing on it only one 
kind of broad perspective, and filtering it through only one 
kind of broad prism. This is especially so because fact-finding 
and the· reporting that is based on it necessarily involves a 
degree of qualitative in-put. 66 However, it should be noted that 
some aspects of UN Human Rights Council-driven IHRFF, 
such as those conducted by working groups and the Universal 
Periodic Review ("UPR") that is handled by the Council itself, 
with their usually geo-politically balanced teams, may not be 
as susceptible . to this kind of critique as other forms of 
IHRFF. 67 And although, the identities of the particular 
researchers who conducted the mission is often left unclear, 
and much remains to be done in this direction, even the large 
international NGOs seem to have begun to adapt their craft to 
blunt some of this criticism by ensuring more balance in their 
IHRFF teams.68 Nevertheless, it bears re-iteration that even if 
West, or was trained in a Western country. US State Department IHRFF is 
basically conducted by US officials. And even the international NGOs are 
undeniably Western-dominated. 
65. See Mutua, "Savages" , supra note 15; Merry, supra note 11 at 242. 
66. See Orentlicher; supra note 2 at 95. 
67. For these kinds of UN Human Rights Council fact-finding, see 
hrtp:llwww.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc!pages!hrcindex. aspx (30 October 
2013). 
68. See for e.g. Human Rights Watch, "'They arc Killing Us': Abuses against 
Civilians in South Sudan's Pibor County," Sept 2013 at 45. 
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the UN, US State Department, and the international NGOs 
could escape the criticism that their teams are dominated by 
Westerners, they usually cannot escape the attack that these 
teams tend to be heavily populated by Western-trained 
persons . The point here is not that a Western-trained person or· 
even a \Vesterner cam1ot bring a different "non-mainstream 
Western" lens to the subject, but that this is usually less likely 
to occur than when s/he is inunersed in the Western idiom and 
experience. 
Other Problematic Methodological Issue~ 
Three methodological questions are discussed here which may 
be asked of IHRFF but do not necessarily or easily relate to 
the colonialist style or approach. These relate to the question 
of selectivity in the choice of targets of IHRFF; the role of 
subjectivity in our inexorably qualitative IHRFF system; and 
the standards of proof that ground IHRFF. conclusions. These 
will be examined once after the other. With regard to the issue 
of the selection of the subjects of IHRFF, of the peoples and 
places where IHRFF is to take place (an issue also encountered 
in anthropology69), it must be acknowledged ~t the outset that 
UN, NGOs, and individual state-driven. IfIRFF have come a 
long way from the time they were focused almost entirely on 
the "other", who was usually located in the Third World. UPR 
has appreciably reduced selective IHRFF at the UN; the 
largest INGOs now tend to survey most states in the world on 
an annual basis; and even the US ammal country reports are 
near-universal in geographical scope. 70 Yet, there is still some 
69. See Merry, supra note 11 at 254. 
70. On the UPR system, see Redondo, supra note 36. On the largest NGOs, see 
for e.g. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012, online: 
hrtp:/lwww.hrw.org/world-report-2012 (30/10/2013). On the US State 
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way to go towards achieving a sufficient degree of fairness 
(with more evenness) in the selection of the targets of IHRFF 
by any of the afore-mentioned categories of fact-finders. For 
instance, as has been noted - despite the onset of the UPR 
mechanism - the analysis of the available UN data suggested 
that almost every single country rapporteur in office between 
2008 and 2013 targeted a Third World state.71 The analysis of 
the available evidence regarding the largest international NGOs 
also suggest~ that although they do tend to issue annual . 
surveys that target developing and developed states alike, the 
other kinds of reports issued by them are still (deservedly or 
otherwise) focused for the most part on the Third World.72 The 
problems with the seemingly selective targeting of certain 
(usually Third World) states for IHRFF have been so 
adequately discussed in the literature that they will not be 
rehashed here. It is sufficient to point out that: (a) it was these 
kinds of concerns that in part led to the most far-reaching 
reform of the UN human rights system since 1945 (leading to 
the creation of the UPR system), 73 and that (b) it is well-
acknowledged that such selectivity tends to denude the popular 
legitimacy of IHRFF among important actors and even 
population areas in the world. 74 
Department, sec Annual Country Reports 2012, online: 
//ttp:/lwww.state.gov/j/rls/llrrp1/ (301I0/2013). 
71. See sub-section 1 of this section of the article. 
72. For e.g., while about 54 of the 58 other kinds of reports issued by Human 
Rights Watch in 2013 (as at 27 October 2013), i.e. over 93%, targeted 
Third World countries, only about 4 of these 58 or so reports, i.e. 6.9 %, 
targeted non-Third World states. Yet, TI1ird World States only make up 
about 78 % of the total number of states in the UN. 
73. For instance, see the commentary of the Child Rights Network on the UPR 
system, online: /11tp:/lwww.cri11.org/HRCIUPR.asp (30/10/2013). 
74. For e.g., see Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 98. 
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With regards to the issue of the role of subjectivity in our 
inexorably qualitative IHRFF system, Frans Viljoen put it well 
when he reminded IHRFF practitioners that they "should be 
aware of their active role in constructing a social reality" in 
the course of their work. 75 Viljoen is also correct when he 
declares that while IHRFF practitioners often put their best 
efforts and do want to examine the relevant situations in as 
objective a maimer as they possibly can, "on the whole, 
though, fact-finding is inherently subjective and depends on a 
multiplicity of factors relevant to the construction of the factual 
world. "76 The point here is not merely that IHRFF in its living 
forms (as opposed to IHRFF in theory or on article) is 
inexorably qualitative, a point that is well-acknowledged in the 
literature and which has been reiterated by at least one senior 
international human rights activist, 77 but also that its findings 
and conclusions are also co-constructed - often unwittingly -
by the very persons who are in theory objectively "looking" at 
the reality in the relevant place or society. The act of 
"knowing" is inherently mediated by a host of subjective 
factors and intermediaries, and IHRFF is not inunune from 
this mediation process . From the choice of places to visit or 
witnesses to interview , to the analysis of the "evidence" 
gathered, the fact-finder 's background perspective on the 
target place and people, her opinions on the issues at hand, her 
training, her biases (or even her prejudices) seep into the 
process of decision-making (e.g. the processes of believing 
some witnesses over the others, or forming conclusions). For 
example, an opinion on whether a glass is half-full or half-
empty at a given point in time is an inexorably qualitative and 
75 . See Viljoen, supra note 5 at 52. 
76. Ibid. 
77. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 95. 
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constructed conclusion. But what really is the problem with 
this, one may ask? The main concern with the way in which 
the fact-finder's background biases (or even prejudices) seep 
into the process of IHRFF is, for example, that the biases that 
most people (including all-too-many Africans) seem to have 
about Africa tend to be very negative in most respects, too 
often blinding them to the positives about the peoples and 
places there, thereby significantly distorting and even 
falsifying to a degree their findings and conclusions. And since 
human rights fact-finders are a part of the societies in which 
they live· and function, IHRFF cannot possibly be entirely 
immune to this problem. Regardless of their factual accuracy, 
one only needs to think of the rampant talk largely in 
uncomplimentary tones about the "Dark Continent" 78 or the 
"Hopeless Continent" 79 to understand this point. More 
specifically, Tiyambe Zeleza has noted the way in which 
human rights discourse tends to speak and write about Africa 
and Africans almost always in terms of their "lack" of 
something. Further, Mutua has demonstrated the way in which 
Africa and Africans continue to be viewed, more often than 
not, as either savages or victims who inhabit a benighted world 
in desperate need of saviours from elsewhere, usually the 
West. 80 These conclusions also apply to the relationship 
between the human rights movement and most of the Third 
World. 81 Thus, much vigilance is required to ensure that 
IHRFF controls for the negative background images that all-to-
many people wittingly or unwittingly bring to their analysis of 
78. C. Achebe: "An lmage of Africa: Racism in Conrad's Heart of Darl01css" 
(1977) 18 Mass L Rev l. 
79. See The Economist, 13 May 2000. 
80. See Mutua: "Savages", supra note 15. 
81. ibid. 
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events in Africa and most of the Third World; biases that can 
refract and distort the reality. 
With regards to the issue of the standard of proof required 
to determine that a piece of information that is offered by a . 
witness being interviewed in a process of IHRFF is factual, 
Theo Boutrouche once stated that the most commonly used 
standard is proof on a balance of probabilities. 82 If this was so 
in all cases, and there was clarity in the understanding of its 
meaning, then there would not a problem with IHRFF in this 
regard. However, an examination of the first report issued by 
th~ Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
established by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate the 
serious abuses of human rights and humanitarian law allegedly 
conm1itted in Syria in the last few years appears to suggest that 
there remains some confusion regarding the standard that 
should be adhered to, and what it means precisely. Indeed, 
while that report explicitly states that "on the specific issue of 
what the facts of human rights violations" in Syria were (and 
not on the question of the identity of perpetrators), the 
standard of proof it used was merely one of "reasonable 
suspicion" 83 this standard was applied in its subsequent 
reports, but described differently as " reasonable grounds to 
believe. " 84 It is unclear how widespread this confusion is 
82. See iloutrouchc, supra note l at 9. 
83. See Report of tile !11depe11de11t l11tematio11al Co111111issio11 of lnq11i1y 011 t/1e 
Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.l, 23 November 2011, 
at para 5; T. Marauhn: "Sailing Close to the Wind: Human Rights Council 
Fact-Finding in Situations of Armed Conflict - The Case of Syria" (2012) 43 
Cal W Jnt 'l LJ 401 at 426. 
84. Sec for e.g., Report of the Independent lntemational Co111111issio11 of Inquiry 
on tile Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/19/69, 22 February 2012, at 
para 10; Report of tire lndependem lntemational Commission of lnquiJy on 
the Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/50, 16 August 2012, at 
paral l. 
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regarding the stanq~d of proof · .w be utilized, since · - as 
Boutruche has noted - most IHRFF teports do not adequately 
: discuss the standards of proof adopted 'in preparing them. 85 
Nevertheless, whatev.er the extei:it of the confusion, at least one 
danger is apparent: if a state .is one . of the "usual suspects", 
one which is already viewed widely as belonging to the club of 
"human rights violators," the mistaken use of a standard that is 
lower than "reasonable · grounds to believe," would mean 
· reliance on a standan;l. that is largely grounded on suspicion 
. and not fact. This WO\lld place the target state at grave risk of 
unfair and inaccura.~e s.tigmati.z~tion. 'This danger of unfair 
stigmatization is compounded w.hen reports that are based on 
· the first report (no m~tter how c~refully ·calibrated and crafted) 
reiterate ~e suspicioil. expressed in the first report as if it was 
in fact already proven on a balance of probabilities or even 
beyo.nd a reasonable dqubt. It sho~ld be noted, of course, that 
if a state walks 4\11 aµiong the group of "innocents" which 
. (whatever their record) tend to . b~ viewed in general as 
resp~c~ers of human rights, then this risk is much more 
remote. 
. ' 
· Susceptibility to Capture by Global Power 
·Apart from TWAIL scholars who have demonstrated or noted 
the r'elationships among human rights movements and global 
net.works or matrixes.of power (hereinafter "global power"),86 
at . least one . senior inte(natio.nal .,human rights activist has 
acknowledged the rather obvious fact that the movement's 
85 . See Boutrouche, supra ~<;>ie l at 10. : . 
86. See B. Rajagopal: Intimational .law froln'. Below (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003);_: See MUtua, ~Savages", supra note .15; Baxi, 
"Future of Human Rights" , supra qo~e 12; Okafor, "Attainments," supra 
note 39.at 310. 
. .. '· 
.,, .. . 
• I. 
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orientation and activities (including those related to IHRFF) 
can have highly important consequences for the behaviour of 
global power toward weaker (especially Third World) states. 87 
For example, development aid can be, and has been, cut off in 
part as a result of one or more IHRFF reports. 88 Such aid can, 
in the result, also be subjected to more or less tough 
conditions. 89 The recent experience of Rwanda is a case in 
point. 90 Similarly, NGO IHRFF has been known to bolster the 
position of lobbyists who want a powerful regime to take one 
course of ·action or another, sometimes against a weaker state. 
Thus, IHRFF often pro.vides information to powerful 
governments for use (for good or for ill) in their policy and 
decision.,.making processes. These are but a few examples of 
the relationships between IHRFF and global power. 91 
However, this is not, of course, to suggest that human 
rights fact-finders always _or mostly set their task with a view 
of serving the interests of global power. Indeed, it is an 
obvious fact that NGO fact-finding reports, for instance, have 
too often contradicted and annoyed many a powerful 
government, including the most powerful of them all. 92 The 
same can be said for some UN human rights reports. 93 The 
87. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 84. 
88. Ibid. 
89. Ibid. 
90. See Su11day Mo11iror, 6 October 2013, online: 
ltt Ip: I llv1111v.111011i I or. co.11g /Ne1vs/National/Kagame-tells-off-Oba111a-011-aid-
c111-over-Co11go-war/-/68833/2019954/-/gua58jzl-li11dex. Ju111l (2 7 October 
2013). 
91. See S. I. Skogly: "Human Rights Reporting: TI1e 'Nordic' Experience" 
(1990) 12 Hum Rts Q 513 al 516. 
92. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 86. 
93. Many of the Reports submitted on the dumping of hazardous waste by 
former Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Ms. 
Fatma-Zora Ouhachi Vesely: had this effect on some powerful states. See 
for e.g. UN Doc.E/CN.4/2004/46/Add. I of 22 December 2003. 
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point here is that, whatever the underlying intent may be, all-
too-often IHRFF praxis does in fact service (or at least reflect) 
the interests and configuration of global power to a significant 
extent. This is easily shown and should hardly be 
controversial among discerning observers of the international 
scene. 
For one, it has long been acknowledged that IHRFF often 
produces the justification for more powerful actors to decide to 
exercise what has come to be referred to, rather too 
optimistically, as their "responsibility to protect" (howsoever 
secondary in nature ·that responsibility is) .94 Again the point is 
not whether or not the specific instance of IHRFF was 
designed to perform this role, but that IHRFF praxis will need 
to be more careful about this capacity of global power to 
influence, or worse still manipulate, the otherwise genuine 
desire of the human rights movement to expose human rights 
abuses. For example, it troubled not a few people bow the 
plight of Afghan women under the Taliban suddenly assumed 
centre-stage as one justification for the invasion and occupation 
of Afghanistan. 95 Secondly, many have noted . the 
disproportionate influence of powerful Western and/or veto:.. 
power endowed governments, as well as the powerful 
international (read largely Western) NGOs on the human rights 
movement in general and on IHRFF in particular. 96 Others 
have commented on the fact that human rights (and by 
94. See A. Orford: fmematio11al Aut/lority and tile Responsibility to Proteci 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); D. 'Kennedy, Tile Dark · 
Side of Virtue (Princeton: Princcton University Press, 2005) at xvii; Riles, 
supra note 39 at 19. 
95. Sec Action Aid, "A Just Peace?: the Legacy of War for the Women of 
Afghanistan," 3 October 2011 at 2. 
96. See Bassiouni, supra note 6; Mutua: "Savages". supra note 15. 
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extension IHRFF) can hardly be discussed intelligently without 
· analyzing the disproportioy.ate influence of powerful large 
donors based primarily i1_1 Europe and the USA who promote 
certain preferred human tfghts projects over others. 9~ Again, it 
appears that, just like its paretit discipline, IHRFF praxis is 
quite weak at disciplining g~obal power (even in a Foucauldian 
sense). 98 How many times,. one may ask, has a veto-power 
endowed (or P5) state been subjected to· serious IHRFF by the 
UN .Human Rights Council or a large international NGO 
(especially one that led to significant consequences)? The 
answer is . "rarely," if one goes by· the number of times the 
most severe Council measure of the appointment of a country 
rapporteur has been applied, but changes to "often" if the less 
severe UPR is utilized as the measure. With regard to IHRFF 
by the international NGOs t~rgeting these states, the answer is 
- as we have seen - quite. s~milar . :How many times have the 
stronger Western states been subjected to such IHRFF? Going 
by the same measures, the: answers appear not to be dissin;iilar 
from the ones offered abov.e: One is then. tempted to ask: is it 
because of its relative capture. by global power that IHRFF 
appears to be complicit to ·the degree · th~t seems evident in 
global power's constructibn qf factual and normative fabrics 
and landscapes which eubji,nce :.the latter's dominance over 
global affairs? . ': ' ~ · · · 
The overall point h.ere':is that IHRFF practitioners need to 
continue Lo worry and even perhaps more so, that power 
refracts the picture of the world we typically receive and 
reproduce. For example, ~igerians or Indian NGOs typically 
don't have the resources to go do IHRFF in any kind of 
sustained way in US inner cities, France's Parisian suburbs, or 
97. See Riles, supra note 39 at I~ .' 
98. See Okafor, "Attainments," supra. note 39. 
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Chechnya. As such .the uncomplimentary pictures of those 
places are not as fore-grounded as they could have become 
were this the case. Is it then capture by global power that 
IHRFF does not tend to fore-ground these images and thus 
bolster the resistance of the subalterns in US inner cities? 
What Should IHRFF then Become? 
It is no secret in informed circles that IHRFF has for long been 
troubled by certain difficulties. and problems. For example, 
Phillip Alston had long characterised IHRFF as 
·methodologically inconsistent, ad hoe, ·and often 
unsatisfactory. 99 It was as a result of similar conclusions 
regarding the state of the art of IHRFF that a host of early 
scholars, commentators and organizations made important 
efforts to propose ways and means of designing, composing 
and conducting IHRFF in the best possible way. Even as of the 
1980s, a measure of consensus had developed in the academic 
literature that IHRFF needed to abide by some basic 
principles, howsoever informal these may be, and whatever the 
risk of over-standardization. 100 Examples of these proposals 
include those made separately by Thomas Franck and Scott 
Fairley, and Dianne Orentlicher. One of the main contributions 
made by Franck and Fairley was to propose that in order to 
ensure the impartiality of IHRFF (something that is highly 
essential for its legitimacy and effectiveness) much care should 
be devoted to five core issues, namely: the choice of subject-
matter of investigation; the choice of mission .members; 
·99. See Alston, supra note 3; Talsma, supra note 3 at 402. 
100. See Blitt, supra note 3 at 58; Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 85; H. Hannum, 
"Fact-Finding by Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations" in ~.B. 
Lillich, ed., Fact-Finding Before llllernationa/ Tribunals (Ardsley-on-
Hudson, N.Y: Transnational Publishers, 1992) at 295. 
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methodology of investigation; the comprehensh~eness of the 
terms of reference; and the way the mission's report will be 
utilized. 101 For her own part, Orentlicher had urged that 
IHRFF missions should avoid a politically-biased selection of 
witnesses; draw upon a broad, diverse and representative 
range of sources; use a large enough sample of testimony; 
corroborate direct testimony; and utilize knowledgeable 
secondary sources in the relevant locales (e.g. domestic 
NGOs, lawyers, foreign diplomats, and journalists). 102 · 
Much more recently, innovative proposals for the 
strengthening of IHRFF have been made in the writings of 
scholars such as Alston .and Gillespie, and Land. Alston and 
Gillespie have proposed the greater use of technology to 
deepen pluralism in IHRFF and bring in local (especially Third 
World) activists more meaningfully into the international 
aspects of that praxis. 103 More specifically, they have, for 
example, called for collaboration among international NGOs 
toward the production of something that is akin to international 
human rights Wikipcdia. 104 For her own part, Molly Land has 
lauded the developing trend toward peer-based production of 
human rights reports which are t.1ien posted onto international 
e-platforms (such as the various Wikis or "the Hub") by many 
of those - usually in the Third World - who were traditionally 
the subjects, and not the agents, of IHRFF (although she notes 
that crcdibilily issues· remain and warns that the most 
JO l. See T.M. Franc.:k and H.S. Fairley: "Procedural Due.: Process in Human 
Rights Pact-Finding by International Agencies (1980) 74 /\m J Int'l L 308 at 
309; Blitt, supra note 3 at 63. 
102. See Orentlicher, supra note 2 at 109. 
103. See P. Alston and C. Gillespie: "Global Human Rights Monitoring, New 
Technologies, and the Politics of Information" (2012) 23 EJIL 1089 at 1114 
[Alston and Gillespie). 
104. Ibid. . 
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uneducated and poorest populations in those places may still 
not be able to participate in nearly as much measure in these 
innovative and pluralizing IHRFF activities as the more elite 
segments). 
But despite all of these attempts to make proposals for the 
reform, systematization and improvement of IHRFF, and the 
many important improvements that have actually been made to 
it, it appears that IHRFF praxis still ~emains significantly 
challenged . to this day by methodological and other difficulti~s 
and problems. As one author has put it, even the UN (which 
began efforts to think through and reform its IHRFF as far 
back as 1970, which adopted a Code of Conduct for some of 
its fact-finders as recently as 2007, and which has made other 
reform efforts since then) has not as yet succeeded in achieving 
much coherency in the methodology of IHRFF. 105 
Against this backdrop, the rest of this section is devoted to· 
pointing to some guideposts and markers that frame and thus 
help define more ideal IHRFF (as seen through a TWAIL 
prism). It should be stated at the outset that there is no 
pretence here that this exercise is a . comprehensive one, or that 
it identifies all the possible characteristics of "ideal IHRFF" -
either in a TW AILian sens~ or howsoever it is conceived. 
First, it must be pointed out that TW AIL would generally not . 
argue for less IHRFF, but would in fact speak in favour of 
more of that praxis (albeit in its more ideal form). This point is 
decipherable from the discussions in the last section of this 
article on the problems wit.h an adherence to the heaven/hell 
binary and the one-way st.reet parad.igm; and the problematic 
nature of the fixation of much IHRFF on the orientation of the 
Western gaze. The major point here is that IHRFF needs to 
105. See Talsma, supra note 3 at 402. 
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continue expanding its geo-political focus even more than it 
already has, well beyond the usual (Third World) suspects. 
Second, as Frans Viljoen has conJ!ctly argued, an IHRF;F 
report "sh0uld be regarded as the outcome of a discurs'ive 
contest in which the fact-finder plays a co-constitutive role. " 106 
Against this background , ideal IHRFF (as seen from a TWAIL: 
perspective) would be designed and conducted by a team that 
. .. ~ is - · as much as possible - gco-politically and ideologically " 
palanced. This kind of .balancing would contribute greatly to 
the· "objectivity" of the fact-finding process, 107 or at least it 
credibility , 108 and would bolster the global legitimacy of 
IHRFF, ·and augment its effectiveness in the long-run. 
· · Problems related to the fixation of much IHRFF on the 
Western gaze, and the one-way traffic paradigm, would also 
be ameliorated in the result. And although the UN Human 
Rights Council prides itself as steeped in such balancing · 
praxis, it should not be forgotten that it currently has over 
forty individual, i.e. one person, special rapporteurs 
(excluding the admittedly balanced "working groups") . The 
largest INGOs engage in this kind of balancing, to an extent, 
but in the view of Viljoen's unassailable point, this practice · 
should become much more systematized and widespread. 
, ' • ... 
Third, IHRFF should become more and more like UPR, 
and less and less like its former, very ad-hoe, and mostly 
selective, self. For sure, IHRFF has come far from its earliest · 
days when it was widely criticized for its excessive selectivity. 
While hardly perfect in this regard, UN IHRFF (mainly 
106: See Viljoen, supra note 5 al 52. · 
107. See L. Talsma: "UN Human Rights Fact-Finding: Protecting a Protection 
Mechanism" (2012) 20 JLSA Q 29 at 31. . 
108. See T.M. Franck and L.D. Cherkis: "The Problem of Fact-Finding 'in 
International Disputes?" (1967) 18 Western Reserve Law Review 1483 at 
1483. . 
..... ... 
·· ·' < • 
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because of the UPJ3. system) and to some extent the IHRFF of 
the largest international NGOs, have become more universal 
than they used to be and therefore less narrowly focused in 
geo-political terms. Thus, the UPR system is a practical 
response that can help blunt the Western gaze, heave~hell 
binary, and one-way street paradigm critiques, among others, 
and should be popul~rized among practitioners of JHRFF, and 
well beyond the UN. system .. 
Fourth, despi·t~ the obvious resource ~onstraints, from a 
TW AIL perspective, I would argue in favour of the 
intensification of the method of country-visits; i.e. the devotion 
and utilization of more substantial periods of time, and in a 
more sustained and repeated way, to each IHRFF mission. The 
UN, international NGOs, and even the US Department of State 
should be conunended for at least using this method to some 
extent and to varying degrees. But as has been noted, the ways 
in which it has been used to date still tends to be far from 
satisfactory . 
And so, the fifth point is that there is a sense in which 
ideal IHRFF would - from a TW AIL perspective - look more 
like the best kinds of (critical) ethnography. Anthropologists 
like Sally E?gle Merry have noted the striking similarities 
between much IHRFF and much ethnography. As she has put 
it , "Human rights activism [including IHRFF] typically relies 
on forms of data collection and research such as surveys, 
personal narratives, and case studies that are similar to 
research methods used in anthropology. " 109 Yet, as these same 
scholars have also qbserved, there are nevertheless significant 
differences between the two fields of endeavour. For, as 
Merry has also noted, "successful activists focus on telling 
109. See Merry, supra note 11at 241. 
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compelling personal cases with simple story lines of suffering 
and responsibility ... designed to generate outrage and 
action: .. Academics are more likely to tell more complex, even 
involuted stories. " 110 Put differently , academics have to use 
nuance and intricacy while activist stories tend to be 
straightforward and emotionally engaging. 111 Given the 
inescapable reality that IHRFF often has to deal with complex 
situations that defy simplistic or linear story lines, the search 
for more credible IHRFF conclusions should be bolstered by a 
greater degree of adherence· to the academic ethnographer's 
approach. · The point here is that the more IHRFF begins to 
look like the ·best ethnography, the more credibility it will have 
in the long term, whatever the short term benefits of deploying 
the current techniques of oversimplification, in order to appeal 
to the. consciences of the .audienc_e. This should not require 
IHRFF to become the exact same thing as critical ethnography 
but rather that · IHRFF simply needs to move farther along in 
that direction. 
1n a similar vein, the sixth point is that IHRFF needs to 
hecotne· .. even more alert to the ~angers of operating from a 
high · o'rbit or ·on a long-distance plan. For, clearly, the 
intricacies of the local human rights condition are not as easily 
observed or appreciated from a far way off or from a thirty-
thousand feet altitude. The potential for error is far greater at 
thi~ height and distance, no matter the power of the long-
distancc lens that is used. Once it is realized tlrnt IHRFF can· 
have grave consequences for the target country. or pcoplC, the 
importance of holistic accuracy becomes even clearer. 
However ,. such a degree of accuracy cannot be achieved 
regarding complex social realities without the kind of deep-. 
110. Ibid at 241. 
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textured local knowledge that can only come from close 
engagement with the target population or phenomenon, usually 
on the ground. 112 With regards to accuracy, such deep 10cal 
knowledge_ can at times be almost the fu ll picture. This is why 
delicate care should be exercised regarding the increasing turn 
to satellite imagery to provide key evidence of violations. 11 ~ 
Satellite imagery should at best be deployed as a supplemental , 
if not marginal, tool. 
Seventh, IH;RFF needs to do more to reduce the 
conceptual economy of appearances that tends to characterize 
and limit its ability to reach as deep an understanding of the 
given situation as it could. In this vein, fact-finding should 
balanc~ contemporary information gathering with socio-
historical contextualization. 114 Only in this way can it capture 
the "complicated and manifold circumstances" that shaped and 
underlie the situation being observed during a mission. 115 Here 
again, critical ethnography - with its tradition of in-depth 
focus on the meanings and practices of small social spaces -
may provide a model, or at least a guide, for IHRFF. 116 
Eighth, seen from a TW AIL perspective, ideal IHRFF 
would be more careful about its susceptibility to deployment 
and manipulation by global power to achieve ends, which are 
in many cases significantly different from its intent. There is 
not, of course, all that much that IHRFF practitioners can do 
about !his io many instances. However, IHRFF practitioners 
still need to be as rci1exive as they can about this possibility, 
112. See IBA, supra note 1 at 3. 
113. See Alston and Gillespie, supra note 103 at 1113. 
114. See Boutruche, supra note 1 at 6. . ! 
11 5. See Bukovski, supra note 59 at l I . 
116. See S.E. Merry: "Anthropology and International Law," (2006) 35 Animal 
Review of Anthropology 99 at 106. 
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and seek to limit any such potential danger of capture in any 
way they can. For example, IHRFF can be more careful about 
making pronouncements in certain cases, and may need to take 
more time to study the relevant situations rather than rush to 
issue press releases and statements based on preliminary 
studies, that are then re-circulated by others as "gospel truth," 
and deployed by global power in unintended ways and as 
i11eans to other ends. 
These are some, and clearly not all, the guideposts to 
designing and conducting "ideal IHRFF", that could be 
offered to IHRFF practitioners from a TWAIL perspective. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, all that remains to be reiterated is that the main 
point of the above exercise is not just to point practitioners and 
academics interested in this area in the direction of the 
guideposts of what could be considered ideal IHRFF praxis, 
from a TW AIL perspective, but to also identify and develop 
tendencies against which, at a minimum, we all ought to 
remain significantly alert to. Certainly such tendencies should 
be combated where they do manifest, but it is also important to 
guard against their manifestation in the first place through 
good IHRFF design and practice. As such, the broader point 
that this article makes is not necessarily that every type or 
iteration of contemporary IHRFF is guilty of one of the pitfalls 
identified in this article, but that good reasons remain for all 
such IHRFF praxis to stand sentry at the gates of U1eir crafts, 
lest they become affected by the problems discussed here. 
Having said this, it must be acknowledged that IHRFF 
does present a number of unique or serious challenges to the 
investigator, and that this will invariably limit overall success 
in achieving ideal IHRFF as conceived in this article. Yet, this 
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realization ougbl not de-mobilize us from making every efforl 
to fashion a sel of standards to which investigators should 
aspire. 117 For as Thomas Franck once remarkedt cleverly I 
must say, "a system's reach must exceed its grasp, or what's a 
heaven for?" 118 
117. See Steinberg, Hertzberg, and Berman, supra note 3 al 89. 
118. See T.M. Franck: Fairness in l111ematio11al Law and lnsriturions (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 7. · 
